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Abstract 
 
Any asynchronous total-order protocol must 
somehow circumvent the well-known FLP 
impossibility result. This paper exposes the 
performance gains obtained when this impossibility is 
dealt with through the use of abstract processes built 
to have some special failure semantics. Specifically, 
we build processes with signal-on-fail semantics by (i) 
having a subset of Byzantine-prone processes paired 
to check each other’s computational outputs, and (ii) 
assuming that paired processes do not fail 
simultaneously. By dynamically invoking the 
construction of signal-on-fail processes, coordinator-
based total-order protocols which allow less than one-
third of processes to fail in a Byzantine manner are 
developed. Using a LAN-based implementation, 
failure-free order latencies and fail-over latencies are 
measured; the former are shown to be smaller 
compared to the protocol of Castro and Liskov which 
is generally regarded to perform exceedingly well in  
the best-case scenarios. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Managing service or state machine replication in 
the presence of faults requires that the non-faulty 
replicas be enabled to determine an identical order on 
client requests [18]. We address this ordering 
requirement when nodes hosting replicas can fail in a 
malicious, Byzantine manner and are connected by an 
asynchronous network, e.g., the Internet, wherein the 
message transfer delays cannot be bounded with 
certainty by a known constant. In particular, we 
propose, and evaluate the benefits of, a novel 
approach to circumvent the well-known FLP 
impossibility [5] which states that the ordering 
requirement cannot be met deterministically if the 
network is asynchronous and if replicas fail even 
merely by crashing, i.e. stopping to function in a 
quiescent manner.  
Several order protocols appear in the literature 
(e.g., [21, 16, 12, 3]), circumventing the FLP 
impossibility in distinct ways. Of them, the Byzantine 
Fault-Tolerant order protocol by Castro and Liskov 
[2], denoted here as BFT, has been shown to have 
outstanding performance, particularly when there are 
no failures. BFT is a co-ordinator based deterministic 
protocol and requires a partially synchronous network 
[4] wherein message delays eventually stabilise to an 
estimated bound for a sufficiently long period of time.  
The protocols developed here are shown to perform 
faster than BFT and also with a smaller message 
overhead in failure-free scenarios. Furthermore, they 
allow most of the replicas to be connected by an 
asynchronous network. 
Our approach to dealing with the FLP 
impossibility is to dynamically construct an abstract 
process with signal-on-crash semantics: it fails only 
by crash and additionally fail-signals its own 
imminent crash. When failures are signalled, the 
impossibility result ceases to apply and when they do 
not involve producing incorrect outputs, a simplified 
protocol structure, smaller latencies and lower 
message overhead ensue. Construction of such a 
process however requires additional assumptions of a 
particular class not uncommon in the literature (e.g., 
[19, 6, 13, 7]): processes of the system are grouped 
and the members of a group are assumed to exhibit 
some prescribed failure behaviour. In our case, a 
subset of processes in the system is paired and the 
paired processes cannot fail at the same time. To this 
end, we consider two alternative assumptions: given 
that one process in a pair has failed, the other remains 
non-faulty (1) for some specified minimum amount of 
time (1_after_1) or (2) for ever (never_2_Fail).  
The paired-up processes, on being called upon, 
construct an abstract, signal-on-crash process similar 
to the way the component processes of the abstract 
fail-stop process [19] maintain the signal-on-crash 
property. They operate in parallel and endorse each 
other’s outputs if the latter are found consistent with 
own outputs. The endorsed outputs are treated as the 
outputs of the signal-on-crash process and the 
endorsement is indicated through digital signatures 
that are assumed to be non-forgeable. If a process 
within a pair suspects a failure of its counter-part, it 
stops all activities related to implementing the signal-
on-crash process abstraction and indicate this stopping 
by outputting a fail-signal message. Thus, the signal-
on-crash process either outputs verifiably-endorsed 
messages of correct contents or stops functioning after 
signalling its stopping. That is, it can only crash and 
when it does, it fail-signals prior to doing so.  
A requirement for failure detection within a 
process pair is that each process be able to detect the 
absence of an output expected from the other. 
Otherwise, an indefinite waiting will result if the 
expected output is not produced.  So, we make 
assumptions concerning the communication delays 
and the relative processing delays between processes 
of a given pair. We consider two delay models: the 
synchronous model (Sync) and the partially 
synchronous model [4] (PSync).  We develop 
protocols for two combinations of assumptions, 
{1_after_1, Sync} and {never_2_Fail, PSync}, and 
study their performance.  
The paper is structured as follows: the next section 
presents the system model and assumptions. Section 3 
describes the signal-on-crash process construction and 
Section 4 the order protocol for {1_after_1, Sync} first 
and then for {never_2_Fail, PSync}. Section 5 
measures and presents the protocols’ fault-free 
performance in relation to both BFT and a simple 
crash-tolerant protocol, and the fail-over latencies. 
Section 6 concludes the paper by examining the 
literature for related work and identifying the 
limitations of our approach. 
 
2. System Model 
 
We suppose that a service, constructed as a 
deterministic state machine, is (as shown in Figure 1) 
replicated over (2f+1), f ≥ 1, nodes connected by a 
network that is reliable and also asynchronous (like 
the Internet) in transferring messages. That is, every 
sent message is delivered uncorrupted at destination(s) 
and message transfer delays are finite but cannot be 
guaranteed to be bounded by a known constant.  
The replica nodes are assumed to fail 
independently of each other, and fr, 0 ≤ fr ≤ f, of them 
can fail in a (cryptography-constrained) Byzantine 
manner. Despite this, the service is to be made fault-
tolerant by meeting the well-known state machine 
replication requirements [18]; the hardest one amongst 
them is to ensure that non-faulty replicas process 
identical sequence of requests sent by the clients of 
this (replicated) service, and this will be the sole focus 
of this paper. For this reason, we regard that the 
clients are correct and the processing of client requests 
is assumed not to require availing of services provided 
elsewhere. (See [11] for making multi-tiered service 
provisioning Byzantine fault tolerant.)  
Of the (2f+1) replica nodes, at least f nodes are 
chosen to be supplemented with a shadow node solely 
for achieving fault-tolerant ordering of client requests 
over an asynchronous network. So, as in [22], these 
shadow nodes are a part of the Asynchrony-Byzantine 
(AB) order supplement scheme (See Fig 1) which is 
distinct from the Byzantine fault-tolerant service 
replication scheme (s1, s2, .. , s(2f+1)).   
 
Figure 1. System Architecture. 
We will denote a process that executes the order 
protocol in the ith replica node as pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ (2f+1), and 
adopt the convention of using ′ to denote the order 
process in a shadow node, e.g., p′i denotes the shadow 
of pi. Note that there is no s′i. The paired processes 
{pi, p′i} may be called on to implement signal-on-
crash process; to this end, their host nodes are 
connected to each other by a fast reliable network. The 
communication between any p′i and pj or p′j, i ≠ j is 
over the reliable asynchronous network of the service 
level replication scheme. Thus, all forms of 
communication in our system except those between 
paired nodes conform to the classical asynchronous 
model. We make three major assumptions that are 
stated below. The first two are commonly made in the 
known Byzantine fault-tolerant solutions to message 
ordering in asynchronous networks.  
 
2.1. Assumptions 
 
Assumption 1. Shadow nodes fail independently and 
also in a Byzantine manner. The total number of failed 
shadow nodes does not exceed fs, 0 ≤ fs ≤ f, such that 
the total number of failed nodes in the system never 
exceeds f: fr+fs ≤ f.  
When exactly f service replica nodes are paired 
with a shadow, we have the optimum requirement for 
Byzantine fault-tolerant ordering: n = 3f +1, where n is 
the total number of nodes in the system.  
Assumption 2. We assume that the known 
cryptographic techniques, such as public-key RSA 
signatures and message authentication codes [20], are 
robust enough to prevent message spoofing and 
replays and to detect message corruption. Specifically, 
a non-faulty process’ signature for a given message 
cannot be forged and any attempt to alter a message 
signed by a non-faulty process will be detected. 
Moreover, the hash-functions used are assumed to be 
1-way and collision-resistant: it is not possible to 
compute information from the digests produced using 
these functions or to find more than one message with 
the same digest. Finally, we assume that a trusted 
dealer initializes the system and the nodes with 
cryptographic keys and hash functions. 
 
2.1.1. Assumptions specific to signal-on-crash 
approach. Say, order processes p and p′ are paired to 
implement a signal-on-crash process. Essentially, each 
checks the other’s output from both value and timing 
perspectives and endorses it if it is deemed correct 
relative to the locally generated output or emits a fail-
signal otherwise. Constructing a signal-on-crash 
process in this way requires making assumptions 
about two timing-related aspects. The first aspect is 
about the ability to accurately estimate a differential 
delay bound within which one order process that has 
produced an output can expect its counter-part to do 
the same, if the counter-part is also operating in a 
timely manner and an output is expected as per the 
order protocol. Obviously, if an accurate estimation of 
this bound cannot be guaranteed, then correct  p and p′ 
can falsely suspect each other of untimely behavior 
and the abstract process will be falsely indicated to 
have ‘crashed’. One could design protocols ruling out 
this false signaling altogether or by coping with it. The 
latter will involve making a relatively weaker 
assumption on the bound estimation process. 
Signal-on-crash semantics cannot be realized if 
both p and p′ can fail simultaneously. The second 
aspect is therefore about eliminating this possibility by 
defining a minimum time interval in which one node 
remains non-faulty while the other has failed. An 
assumption becomes very strong if this interval is 
taken to be infinity. Below, we make two distinct sets 
of assumptions; each set has a stronger assumption 
regarding one aspect and a weaker one on the other.  
 
Assumption 3(a):  
(i) The delay estimates used for assessing the 
timeliness of an order process are accurate and 
non-faulty processes never judge each other to be 
untimely. (accurate delay estimation) 
(ii) The processes p and p′ within any given node pair 
do not fail ‘simultaneously’: if one of them, say, p 
fails then p′ does not fail at least until it observes 
the failure of p and an interval of 2D time elapses 
subsequent to the observation, where D is the 
unknown (but finite) bound on the communication 
delays over the reliable asynchronous network. 
(sequential failure pattern)  
3(a)(i) means that when an order process of a non-
faulty node does not receive an expected response 
from its counter-part within the delay estimate used, 
then the other node has become faulty at that moment. 
Assumption 3(b):  
(i) The delay estimates used for assessing the 
timeliness of an order process become accurate 
eventually: when the nodes within a pair remain 
non-faulty, there is an unknown timing instance 
after which neither order process will find the 
other untimely. (eventually accurate delay 
estimation) 
(ii) At least one of the ordering processes p and p′ 
does not fail. (at most one fault) 
Remarks: Assumptions on delay estimation accuracy. 
3(a)(i) regards the node-pair as a well-provisioned and 
well-engineered distributed system (e.g., [9]) and the 
delay estimates are always accurate. This view 
conforms to the traditional, albeit restrictive, 
synchronous model.  3(b)(i) allows estimated delays to 
become inaccurate occasionally together with a 
condition that the estimates eventually become 
accurate. This is the characteristic of the timed 
asynchronous [1] and partially synchronous [4] 
models.   
Obviously, 3(b)(i) is weaker, and hence easier to 
realize, than 3(a)(i). A major implication of 3(b)(i) is 
that prior to the unknown timing instance, non-faulty 
order processes within a node pair may find each other 
untimely and consequently emit fail-signal to indicate 
the ‘crash’ of the signal-on-crash process they 
implement. If they later find each other timely, they 
can optimistically assume that the unknown timing 
instance has passed and resume implementing the 
signal-on-crash process. This amounts to the abstract 
process being restarted after a crash. Thus, the second 
assumption leads to signal-on-crash and recovery 
semantics, and further details can be seen in sub-
section 4.4.  
Remarks: Assumptions on node failures. Both 3(a)(ii) 
and 3(b)(ii) rule out both the nodes of a pair failing 
simultaneously, say, due to the same underlying cause 
e.g., a failure of common power supply or a common 
design flaw that can be exploited by an attacker. They 
require exercising measures to ensure failure 
independence between the nodes and in particular 
eliminating any possible common failure modes 
through means such as diversity of node hardware and 
operating systems and housing the nodes at distinct 
locations. With fail-independence sufficiently assured, 
3(a)(ii) is realistic in practice.  For example, when 
nodes of a pair fail independently with an exponential 
failure rate µ, the probability that both nodes will not 
fail within 2D time of each other turns out be 
99.999923% and 99.9998% when D  is 1 and 2.5 
seconds respectively with 1/µ being 30 days. 3(b)(ii) 
however is a stronger assumption since it expects at 
least one node to remain non-faulty throughout the 
mission time. The larger is the latter, the less likely 
that it will hold. For longer operative periods, we 
require that the signal-on-crash process be built using 
more than two processes when 3(b)(ii) is assumed; 
more precisely, each of the selected replica nodes (see 
Figure 1) needs to be supplemented with φ, φ > 1, 
shadow nodes and at most φ nodes can fail in a given 
AB-order supplement group. 
 
3. The Signal-on-Crash Set-up  
 
In this set-up, assumptions 3(a)(i) and 3(a)(ii) hold 
and exactly f replica nodes are paired with one 
shadow. Thus, the set of processes executing the order 
protocol is {p1,  p2, .. ,  p(2f+1),  p′1,  p′2, .. , p′f} and 
there are n = 3f+1 processes in total. We reserve the 
term doubly-signed to mean that a message is signed 
by two processes in sequence: the second process 
considers the signature of the first as a part of the 
contents it signs for. Thus, through a double-signed 
message, the second signatory can indicate its 
approval on the contents of the message that the first 
signatory has computed. Finally, clients are assumed 
to direct their requests to all nodes and thus all non-
faulty processes receive each request that needs to be 
sequenced before processing. 
 
3.1. Mutual Checking and Output 
Endorsement 
 
Each of the paired processes, e.g., pi or p′i, 1≤i ≤f, 
executes the protocol like any unpaired process, pi, 
f+1≤i≤2f+1, in addition to collaborating with its paired 
counter-part to implement a signal-on-crash process.  
This collaboration in normal form involves each 
process (i) forwarding to its counterpart process a 
copy of every message it receives and sends over the 
asynchronous network, and (ii) verifying if the 
messages sent by the other process are correct (as per 
the order protocol) in value domain, and also correct 
in the time domain (using the delay estimate). 
The collaboration between paired processes takes a 
more active form when the pair acts as the coordinator 
of the order protocol.  (Note that our protocol, like 
BFT [2], is coordinator-based and deterministic.)  
When the pair {pi, p′i} acts as the co-ordinator, pi 
decides an order for each unordered client request and 
forwards its signed decision only to its shadow p′i. 
(See Fig. 2.) If the latter finds the order decision of pi 
to be valid (i.e., observes no value-domain failure), 
then it endorses the decision by double-signing it and 
sending the doubly-signed decision to all processes 
(including pi). When pi receives an authentic, doubly-
signed message from p′i, it forwards the received to all 
other processes (including p′i). p′i will also monitor 
whether pi is deciding an order for every request 
which it has forwarded; not deciding an order will 
constitute a time-domain failure by pi. It is easy to see 
that the paired processes operate together as a single 
non-faulty coordinator (except for the doubly-signed 
output format), so long as no non-faulty process in the 
pair observes a failure on its counter-part. 
 
Figure 2. Order Endorsement. 
 
3.2. Fail-Signalling on ‘Crash’ 
 
At the time of system initialisation, each paired 
process is assumed to have been supplied with a fail-
signal message signed by its counter-part. On 
detecting a value- or time-domain failure, a process 
double-signs the fail-signal it has been supplied with, 
and broadcasts the doubly-signed fail-signal to all 
other processes (including its counter-part). Similarly, 
when a process receives an authentic, doubly-signed 
fail-signal from its counter-part, it also double-signs 
the fail-signal it has and broadcasts the doubly-signed 
message. After having emitted fail-signal, processes 
stop their collaboration for implementing the signal-
on-crash process. 
An authentic, doubly-signed fail-signal, on being 
received, informs a destination process that the 
signatories of the received fail-signal decided not to 
work as a pair any longer (but will continue to operate 
as individual entities). It also causes the destination 
process to echo the fail-signal to the first signatory in 
case the second signatory has (maliciously) omitted to 
send the fail-signal to its counterpart. Thus, a signal-
on-crash process, implemented through mutual-
checking of outputs, doubly-signed endorsement and 
fail-signaling, has the following properties:  
SC1: Any authentic, doubly-signed message from a 
process pair is uniquely attributable to the source and 
contains correct information.  
SC2: An authentic doubly-signed fail-signal is a 
definitive indicator of one faulty process in the source 
pair. 
SC3: If a non-faulty process receives an authentic 
doubly-signed fail-signal from a given pair, every 
non-faulty is guaranteed to receive an authentic 
doubly-signed fail-signal from that pair. 
 
4. The Order Protocol with Signal-on-
Crash Set-up 
 
The protocol defines a fixed set of f+1 
sequentially-ranked co-ordinator candidates, {Cc: 1 ≤ 
c ≤ (f+1)}, comprising all f process-pairs and a 
randomly-chosen unpaired process. The former are 
ranked prior to the latter (the unpaired process). For 
the sake of exposition, let Cc be {pc, p′c} for 1 ≤ c ≤ f 
and Cf+1 be pf+1.  
 Each process has a variable c that holds the rank 
of the candidate currently acting as the coordinator 
and is initialized to 1. That is, the protocol initially 
assigns C1 as the coordinator. Cc, 2 ≤ c ≤ (f+1), can 
take over the coordinator role only if all C1, .. , Cc-1 
have fail-signalled, i.e., only if each pair {pi, p′i}, 1 ≤ i 
≤ (c-1), has emitted an authentic, double-signed fail-
signal. By SC2, a fail-signalling process-pair has a 
faulty process in it. Therefore, when the unpaired 
process pf+1 takes over as the (f+1)th coordinator, it 
must be non-faulty and remain so.  So, the processes 
readily accept the ordering decisions of the (f+1)th 
coordinator. In what follows, we would describe the 
more challenging part of the protocol involving only 
the first f coordinators. 
 When c= i, the process pair {pi, p′i} operates as 
the coordinator as described earlier: pi decides a 
unique, in-sequence order for each client request 
which, if found valid, is endorsed by p′i (see Figure 2); 
authentic, doubly-signed order decisions are thus 
transmitted by both pi and p′i to other processes.  
Producing doubly-signed order decisions constitutes 
the first two phases of our protocol and is shown in 
Figure 3(a) where the pair {p1, p′1} is acting as the 
coordinator. Such an order decision will be denoted as 
order<c, o, D(m)> where o is the unique sequence-
number assigned to the request m and D(m) is a digest 
of m. Since clients are correct and direct their requests 
to all nodes, the order for m does not contain m itself. 
A process that receives a doubly-signed order, 
executes the normal part of the protocol in an attempt 
to commit m to o: the request m irreversibly gets 
assigned to the sequence number o indicated in the 
order message.  The coordinating process pair may 
emit a fail-signal which calls for the installation of the 
next coordinator. This installation is carried out by an 
execution of the install part of the protocol. The two 
parts of the protocol are described below. 
 
4.1 The Normal Part of the Protocol 
 
Any process pi that has received an authentic, 
doubly-signed, in-sequence order executes the 
following steps: 
N1: Multicast a signed ack (that also contains the 
received order) to all processes (including itself); 
N2: Wait until ack or order is received from at least 
(n-f) distinct processes; 
N3: Commit order and retain the (n-f) distinct 
ack/order received as a proof of commitment; 
 The last (commit) phase of Figure 3(a) shows the 
execution of steps N2 and N3. Figure 3(b) depicts the 
three phases which the BFT will take to commit an 
order to facilitate an easy comparison. (Replica 1 is 
acting as the BFT coordinator.) Note that the three 
phases of BFT involve: 1 to n (coordinator to all), n to 
n, and again n to n message transmission. The purpose 
of the prepare phase is to verify if the coordinator can 
be trusted in what it sent during the pre-prepare 
phase. When a process-pair (with signal-on-crash 
semantics) is acting as the coordinator, n to n 
                      
Figure 3. Fail-Free 3-phase Operation:  (a) Our Protocol. (b) BFT. 
transmissions of the prepare phase is obviously not 
needed and the 3-phased exchanges become: 1 to 1 
(for endorsement), 2 to n (endorsed output to all), and 
n to n. 
 
4.2. The Install Part of the Protocol 
 
A process pi that receives an authentic, doubly-
signed fail-signal from pc or p′c executes these steps: 
IN1: c:= c+1. Ignore any incoming order message 
until the new coordinator is installed. Prepare 
BackLog message containing (a) received fail-signal, 
(b) committed order with the largest sequence number 
(max_committed) together with the proof of 
commitment, and (c) all acked but uncommitted 
orders. Multicast BackLog to all processes. 
IN2: If pi = pc then wait until BackLog is received 
from at least (n-f) distinct processes. Compute 
NewBackLog and start_o as mentioned below and 
prepare a Start message containing those two. If pc is 
a paired process, sign and send Start with all (n-f) 
BackLogs to p′c else sign and multicast Start to all 
processes. p′c verifies if pc computed properly the 
Start as per the (n-f) BackLogs received with it. If 
Start is found valid, it is doubly-signed and multicast. 
IN3: If f > 1, any pi or p′i, i ≠ c, that receives an 
authentic doubly- signed Start, generates its signature 
for the received and sends its unique identifier and the 
signature to pc and  p′c. 
IN4: pc and p′c, after receiving identifier-signature 
tuples from (f-1) distinct processes (other than 
themselves), multicasts these tuples to all.  
IN5: Any pi that receives an authentic doubly-signed 
Start and (f-1) identifier-signature tuples, regards that 
the new coordinator has been installed, treats Start as 
an order message with sequence number start_o and 
executes the normal part of the protocol to get Start 
committed. Once committed, all order messages 
included in it are considered committed as well. Note 
if the max_committed of pi is smaller than the smallest 
o of order messages contained in Start, it is possible 
that pi has some order messages missing. In that case, 
pi is guaranteed to receive each of those order 
messages from at least (f+1) correct processes due to 
the way NewBackLog is computed. So it waits for 
(f+1) agreeing order messages to be received. 
The process pc computes NewBackLog by first 
including the order that has the largest sequence 
number (o) amongst all the max_committed orders 
received in the (n-f) BackLogs. (Let 
max{max_committed} denote o of this order.) It 
then includes every uncommitted order present in any 
of the (n-f) BackLogs with sequence no. > 
max{max_committed}.  
It is possible that p′c finds order<c-1, o, D(m)> 
and order<c-1, o, D(m’)>, m ≠ m’, in the (n-f) 
BackLogs which it received from pc (together with 1-
signed Start). If so, it should verify whether pc has 
chosen to put the ‘right’ order, if any, into the 
NewBackLog, where the right order is the one that 
might have been committed by some correct process. 
This verification is done using the BackLogs which 
p′c received directly from other processes. Omitting 
the details for the sake of simplicity, we present only 
the principles underpinning this verification. If both 
order<c-1, o, D(m)> and order<c-1, o, D(m’)>are 
doubly-signed and authentic, then both  pc-1 or p′c-1 
have failed and, by assumption 3(a)(ii), at least 2D 
time has elapsed subsequent to the first of these 
failures has been observed. So, if, say, order<c-1, o, 
D(m)>, is committed by some process, then p′c will 
have at least (f+1) processes having included order<c-
1, o, D(m)>   in their backlogs and only at most f 
processes having included order<c-1, o, D(m’)>.  
 
4.3. Protocol Optimizations 
 
This sub-section presents two optimisations. The 
first one seeks to reduce the number of processes 
injecting messages on to the network. By property 
SC3 and assumption 3(a)(i), a fail-signalled pair does 
have at least one failed process in it. So, every time a 
new coordinator is installed, the processes of the old 
coordinator are turned into ‘dumb’ processes which 
can execute the protocol but cannot transmit 
messages.  The total number (n) of processes in the 
system is reduced by 2 to account for the new dumb 
processes and the maximum number (f) of faulty 
processes by 1. 
The second optimisation aims to reduce the 
number of order messages and ack messages injected 
into the system through batching of order messages. 
The coordinator process pc batches the doubly-signed 
order messages generated over a period of time, 
batching-interval, and transmit a batch of order 
messages; similarly, processes transmit ack messages 
for a batch of order messages. Note that batch-size 
can become large if a long batching-interval is chosen 
or if too many client requests are sent. The effects of 
varying batching-interval and batch-size are studied in 
Section 5. 
 
4.4 Protocol Extension for Signal-on-Crash 
and Recovery Set-up 
 
We suppose now that the assumptions of 3(b) hold 
instead of those of 3(a). Observe that only 3(b)(i) is 
weaker compared to 3(a)(i). So, the extension needs to 
address only the implications that arise due to 
weakening of 3(a)(i), possibly by taking advantage of 
assumption 3(b)(ii): at least one process within a pair 
is always non-faulty.  
 A major implication of 3(b)(i) being weaker is that 
paired-processes pc and p′c may find each other 
untimely even if both are non-faulty. So, after having 
fail-signalled, if they subsequently find each other 
timely through their continued mutual-checking (see 
Section 3.1), they should work as a pair if the need 
arises. Thus, SC2 holds no longer. Each process pc or 
p′c maintains a status variable statusc that indicates the 
operative status of the pair: {up, down, 
permanently_down}. statusc is irreversibly set to 
permanently_down when a process observes a value 
domain failure of its counter-part. 
 Since SC2 does not hold, it can no longer be 
ascertained that f failures have occurred if f distinct 
process-pairs have fail-signalled, and therefore when 
the un-paired pf+1 becomes the coordinator it cannot 
be expected to be non-faulty. So, (at least) (f+1) 
process-pairs are now required and we assume that 
pf+1 is paired with p′f+1, bringing n = 3f+2; 
furthermore, only paired processes are allowed to act 
as coordinators. Note that there will be at least one 
process pair in which both processes are non-faulty 
and see each other timely starting from some unknown 
time. So, eventually, there is a process-pair whose 
operative status will be always up. However, until that 
always-up pair emerges and becomes the coordinator, 
the system can be in an unstable state, calling for 
frequent coordinator changes.  We propose to use the 
view-change part of BFT protocol, except for the 
following modifications: 
For view v, the pair {pc, p′c} is the coordinator 
candidate where c = (v mod (f+1)) if (v mod (f+1)) ≠ 0, 
c = (f+1) otherwise. If pc or p′c does not have statusc = 
up when a ViewChange(v) message is received and 
therefore does not want to act as the coordinator for 
the proposed new view v, then it multicasts an 
Unwilling(v) message which includes the fail-signal 
message as well. Any process that receives 
Unwilling(v) echoes it back to both pc or p′c  and, as in 
the BFT protocol, multicasts a ViewChange(v+1) 
message.  (Note that non-coordinator processes do not 
wait on timeout: they either expect view v to be 
installed or Unwilling(v) to be received.) If, on the 
other hand, pc and p′c have statusc = up, pc acts as the 
‘primary process’ of the BFT protocol, with all its 
messages get endorsed and multicast by p′c as shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
5.  Protocol Implementation and 
Performance Study  
 
The protocols were implemented in Java using 
JDK 1.5 and on a cluster of 15 Linux machines 
(Fedora Core 4) connected by a LAN. Each machine 
has a 2.80 GHz Pentium IV processor and 2GB RAM. 
Paired processes communicate using RMI and the 
unpaired ones using TCP/IP sockets. The performance 
study has two parts: the first is of comparative nature 
in the best-case scenario and the second involves 
assessing our protocols’ ability to deal with failures.  
The comparative performance study considers our 
protocols, BFT and a crash-tolerant protocol, denoted 
as CT. The best-case scenario for all these protocols 
is: no failures and also no suspicions of failures (see 
also [2]). In this scenario, the unknown timing 
instance of assumption 3(b)(i) (in sub-section 2.1.1) is 
the system start-up time itself, i.e., 3(b)(i) becomes the 
same as 3(a)(i). So, the protocol developed for the 
Signal-on-Crash set-up (denoted from now on as SC) 
behaves identically to its extension for the Signal-on-
Crash and Recovery set-up. Their distinction is 
meaningful only in the second part of the study. CT is 
simply derived from SC, with no process being paired 
and no cryptographic techniques used.  Specifically, 
the shadow processes are excluded from the system 
(hence n = 2f+1), the coordinator process directly 
sends its order message to all other processes, and an 
order message is committed in the same way as SC. 
CT performance can therefore be used to see the 
extent of slow-down in BFT and SC when the type of 
faults tolerated switches from crash to Byzantine. The 
parameters we measure are precisely defined below. 
Latency is the time interval between the instance the 
request is batched by the coordinator and the instance 
the first process commits a sequence number (o) for 
that request. This does not include the time duration a 
received request spends waiting to be batched. 
Throughput is the number of messages committed by 
an order process per second.  
Fail-over latency is measured as the time interval 
between the moment the current coordinator issues 
fail-signal and the instance the new coordinator issues 
a Start message with (f+1) identifier-signature tuples.  
The parameters we vary are described below. 
Batching interval is varied from 40 milliseconds (ms) 
to 500 ms, and the batch_size is fixed at 1 KB. 
Cryptographic techniques, used for these 
experiments, constitute of three distinct combinations 
of message digest and signature schemes: MD5 for 
taking message digests together with RSA scheme for  
key sizes of 1024 and 1536, and SHA1 with DSA for 
the key size of 1024.  
Fault- tolerance parameter (f) takes the value of 2 
and 3.  
BackLog size is varied between 1 KB to 5 KB to 
examine its effect on fail-over latency.  
 The results of our performance study are 
presented in the following manner. Figure 4 depicts 
order latency vs. batching interval for all three 
protocols, each for all three cryptographic techniques 
and f fixed at 2. Figure 5 shows throughput vs. 
batching interval for all three protocols with all three 
cryptographic techniques and f fixed at 2.  Finally, 
figure 6 shows the fail-over latencies of the SC 
protocol and its extension for the Signal-on-Crash and 
Recovery set-up, which we denote as SCR. They are 
measured for various BackLog sizes, for all three 
crypto-techniques and for f = 2. Each point in a graph 
is an average over 100 experimental results. 
 
Order Latency: As depicted in Fig 3, BFT has three 
phases to order a request involving: 1 to n 
(coordinator to all), n to n, and again n to n message 
transmissions; the SC has its three phases as: 1 to 1 
(for endorsement within the pair), 2 to n (endorsed 
output to all), and n to n transmissions. Note that CT 
will only have the first and the second phases of SC 
combined into one (crash-prone) coordinator 
disseminating to all (1 to n) followed by n to n 
transmissions; also no cryptographic overhead is 
incurred. 
 Referring to figure 4, the order latencies stay 
nearly constant for large values of the batching 
intervals, indicating that the system operates in steady-
state (i.e., in light or normal load conditions). They 
stay constant at 10 ms for CT, but increase drastically 
for BFT and SC when the batching interval decreases 
below a threshold, pushing the system operation into a 
‘saturation’ region. (Note that latencies are 
represented in log scale along y-axis.) Further, the 
threshold for BFT is larger than that for SC. This 
indicates that BFT has a tendency to push the system 
into saturation earlier due to the large number of 
messages it places in the system and the cryptographic 
operations performed on each message.  For the same 
reason, the steady-state latency for BFT is always 
more than that for SC. However, it is interesting to see 
that the differences in steady-state latencies of SC and 
BFT increase considerably when crypto-technique is 
changed from RSA (Figures 4a, 4b) to DSA scheme 
(Figure 4c). For example, RSA with key size 1024 
gives a difference of 21ms between steady-state 
latencies of SC and BFT while the difference is 37ms 
when DSA scheme is used for authentication. The 
explanation is as follows. In both the schemes the time 
taken to sign a given message is similar; however, 
signature verification is much faster in the RSA 
scheme compared to DSA.  Furthermore, in a typical n 
to n message exchange, each process signs one 
message while it needs to verify at least (n-f) 
messages. Therefore, there is a more pronounced 
slowing down of BFT due to the slowness of DSA 
verification. This suggests that DSA is generally not 
suited for Byzantine order protocols.  
As we increase f to 3 (not shown here to avoid 
repetition), we observe similar trends, except that the 
saturation thresholds are encountered at larger 
batching_intervals, and the order latencies in the 
steady state increase. These observations can be 
attributed to the fact that as n increases, each 
individual process receives more messages which 
need to be authenticated and processed. 
 
Throughput: Throughput was observed to be low for 
larger batching intervals for all the three crypto-
techniques with f=2. Figure 5 shows that with 
decreasing batching intervals, throughput increases 
until the system reaches the saturation point after 
which it starts dropping down. This behavior was 
observed for both SC and BFT whereas the drop could 
not be observed for CT for the range of batching 
intervals used. 
    
Figure 4: Order latency for f = 2 using (a) MD5 with RSA key size 1024 (b) MD5 with RSA key size 
1536 (c) SHA1 with DSA key size 1024. 
Observing the behavior of the three protocols for 
any of the crypto-technique, we confirm the 
conclusion drawn about BFT above that it causes 
system saturation earlier than the other two and 
throughput starts dropping immediately after entering 
saturation point which is found to stay stable for a 
while in case of SC. Here also saturation was observed 
to occur earlier with more expensive crypto-
techniques. 
 
Fail-Over Latency: Experiments were run to assess 
the effect of occurrences of faults on the performance 
of SC and SCR. A single value-domain fault was 
injected in the system and the duration for switching 
between the coordinators was measured for all three 
cryptographic schemes. It can be observed that the 
fail-over latency increases linearly with backlog size 
which was varied from 1 to 5 KB.  
 
6. Related work and Conclusions 
  
 The FLP impossibility is typically circumvented 
by making synchrony assumptions (e.g., Rampart 
[15], SecureRing [8], TTCB [21], ITUA [16]), 
through quorum systems [12] or randomisation [3]. 
We note that some of the systems in the first category, 
like our protocol with assumption 3(a)(i), can violate 
safety if strong synchrony assumptions they make are 
not met, where safety is the property that non-faulty 
processes do not order requests differently. On the 
other hand, the BFT [2] and our extended protocol 
with assumption 3(b)(i), require weak synchrony 
assumptions only to guarantee liveness. Randomised 
protocols make no synchrony assumptions and 
liveness is guaranteed in probabilistic terms to be a 
certainty with the passage of time. Our protocols also 
make no synchrony assumptions between unpaired 
processes but offer deterministic liveness guarantees. 
(Assumptions 3(a)(i) and 3(b)(i) are concerned only 
with the paired processes.) 
 On the optimistic order protocols, some of the 
earlier work was done by Pedone and Schiper [14], 
which exploits not just the absence of failures but also 
the possibility of multicasts over a LAN being 
naturally received in the same order (spontaneous 
total-order). Following BFT [2], several optimistic 
Byzantine fault-tolerant order protocols were 
published (e.g., [23, 10, 17]), but none of them has 
been experimentally evaluated to the best of our 
knowledge. These protocols have the following design 
flavour: they are coordinator based in the normal part 
and when optimistic conditions are deemed not to 
hold, a (randomized) consensus protocol is executed 
to remedy the situation.  
We have here developed an optimistic Byzantine 
fault-Tolerant order protocol that is demonstrated to 
perform better than a protocol best-known for its fail-
free performance and practicability. We have achieved 
this by carefully applying a technique long-known for 
building robust process abstractions [19] that are 
easier to program with; abstract processes with signal-
on-crash property, are deployed to act as coordinators 
for order protocols. Consequently, not only the order 
latency and the message overhead fall but also the 
protocol becomes easier to implement and no 
synchrony assumptions need to be made among the 
(un-paired) processes that do not have to cooperate to 
build the signal-on-crash abstraction. These benefits 
come at a cost: paired-up processes cannot fail 
simultaneously. We meet this requirement by 
assuming that if both processes fail, the failure 
   
Figure 5: Throughput for f = 2 using (a) MD5 with RSA key size 1024 (b) MD5 with RSA key size 
1536 (c)  SHA1 with DSA key size 1024. 
 
Figure 6: Fail-Over Latency in SC and SCR for 
f = 2 using all three crypto techniques
 
occurrences are separated by a threshold interval 
(assumption 3(a)(ii)) or that at least one process never 
fails (assumption 3(b)(ii)). We have argued that both 
the assumptions require implementation of measures 
that assure failure-independence, that 3(a)(ii) is 
realistic, and that a robust realisation of 3(b)(ii) 
involves using more than two processes to build the 
signal-on-crash abstraction. The latter in turn calls for 
making a trade-off between the (falling) hardware cost 
and the (much desired) performance benefits. 
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